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ABSTRACT 
Multiparental family structures, in which there are more than two 
parents, are becoming increasingly common. Thus, they defy the social 
and legal conception of the nuclear family. Yet, despite the growing 
number of multiparental families, their legal status in most jurisdictions 
is not recognized, leaving various issues unaddressed and potentially 
risking the children’s best interests. This paper examines how the 
legislatures and courts of California, Canada, and the U.K. recognize 
and regulate multiparental families. It shows that the treatment of 
multiparental families varies from non-recognition of any status, through 
regulation of the multiparental family, to the recognition of the 
multiparental family based on parental agreements. The paper identifies 
five distinct categories of multiparental family structures, and suggests 
that the allocation of parental status should be made possible to each of 
these structures. To do so, it is suggested that the allocation of parental 
status will not be determined by traditional doctrines. Rather, it should 
be guided by both the intentions of the parties to the parental agreement, 
and the child’s best interests. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many years, the “traditional” family structure, namely a heterosexual, 
monogamous couple and their biological children, has not been the only 
family structure in Western societies.  Rising divorce rates,1 stepfamilies, 
cohabitation, co-parenting, assisted reproductive technologies, LGBT 
families, and open adoptions have all contributed to this development.  Due 
to this departure from a single model of family structure, it is not surprising 
that the definition of the nuclear family has been a subject of debate in recent 
years.2 
                                                          
* Vanier Scholar; SJD Candidate, University of Toronto; LL.M. (Cantab); LL.B. I want 
to thank Omri Ben-Zvi, Michael Birnhack, Yishai Blank, Mercedes Cavallo, Rory Gillis, 
Benjamin Graff, Dafna Hacker, Nadia Lambek, Tal Morse, Arthur Ripstein, Eden Sarid, 
Jens Scherpe, Philip Stefanovski, and Hedi Viterbo, for their critiques and suggestions; 
The participants of the 2016 Critical Legal Conference, and the 4th annual Tel Aviv 
University Law in a Changing Society Workshop for their helpful comments; and the 
staff of the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law for their 
very helpful editing on this article. 
 1. Divorce Rates Data, 1858 to Now: How Has It Changed?, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 
6, 2014), www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jan/28/divorce-rates-marriage-
ons; Christopher Ingraham, Divorce is Actually on the Rise, and It’s the Baby Boomer’s 
Fault, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/03/27/divorce-is-actually-on-the-rise-and-its-the-baby-boomers-fault. 
 2. See generally Sally Bould, Familial Caretaking: A Middle-Range Definition of 
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Changes to what society perceives as a family have impacted how “parent” 
is defined.  New lifestyles and social practices have not only led to the 
establishment of various family structures but also prompted multiple adults 
to simultaneously seek the much-coveted label of “parents.”  Although 
legislatures and courts have been open to different approaches to the 
definition of parenthood, so far they have been somewhat reluctant to forego 
the notion that a child can have two legal parents at most at any given time.  
As will be established below, this lack of recognition leaves the multiparental 
families in a socially and legally vulnerable position.3  Its members do not 
enjoy the same certainty about their rights and obligations “traditional” 
families do.  Consequently, the child’s best interests are endangered. 
However, this “rule of two”4 has been challenged recently to various 
degrees in courts and amongst legislatures.  Similarly, several legal scholars 
have advocated for the recognition of multiparental families.  They 
addressed the questions of whether multiparents should be awarded legal 
status, and the form in which these family structures should be recognized.5 
Nonetheless, they have not taken into account the various types of 
multiparental families. In some instances, the structure chosen by the 
multiparents is egalitarian, meaning that they all perceive themselves as 
having the same status, rights, and obligations. In other cases, the model is 
hierarchal, with some individuals holding full parental status, rights, and 
obligations, while others have a more limited standing. By omitting from 
their consideration both egalitarian and hierarchal structures, even those who 
advocated for recognition of multiparents did not offer a solution that 
captures this socio-legal phenomenon in its entirety. 
                                                          
Family in the Context of Social Policy, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 133, 134 (1993); Stuart Bridge, 
Marriage and Divorce: The Regulation of Intimacy, FAMILY LAW: ISSUES, DEBATES, 
POLICY, (Johnathan Herring ed., 2001); William C. Duncan, Don’t Ever Take a Fence 
Down: The Functional Definition of Family – Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 57-58 (2001); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic 
Definition of “Family” 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1991). 
 3. See infra p. 18–19 and note 73. 
 4. See Elizabeth Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, (July 6, 2007), 
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/opinion/16marquardt.html?_r=0. 
 5. See generally Katharine Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of 
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 654 (2008) [hereinafter Bionormativity]; Katharine 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives 
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-882 (1984) 
[hereinafter Rethinking Parenthood]; Melanie Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating 
Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. 
& FAM. STUD. 309 (2007) [hereinafter Why Just Two?]. 
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This paper provides a novel comprehensive categorization of the various 
multiparental family structures, and examines how legislatures and courts in 
California, British Columbia, and England recognize and regulate 
multiparental families.6  The analysis section shows that the states’ treatment 
varies from non-recognition of any status, through regulation of the 
multiparental family (i.e. determining who is a parent, what constitutes 
parenthood, and what is the scope of each parent’s rights and 
responsibilities), to their recognition by giving legal force to parental 
agreements.  Moreover, the paper indicates that even in those jurisdictions 
that do allocate parental status to multiparents, not all multiparental 
structures are recognized. Each jurisdiction awards status on either an 
egalitarian or hierarchal model, but does not cater for both. 
Drawing on these findings, the paper suggests that the method of 
allocation of parental status should be flexible enough to cater for all five 
multiparental structures.  Therefore, the traditional doctrines of allocation of 
parental status should be abandoned.  Instead, the focus should be on the 
intentions of the parties to a parental agreement, as well as the child’s best 
interests.  Parental agreements of multiparental families should be 
recognized by the state as long as the family members are in agreement as to 
each-other’s parental status, leaving the power to form a family and 
determine rights and responsibilities in the hands of individuals.  However, 
if they are in disagreement, then the family should be regulated by the state, 
placing more emphasis on the child’s best interests. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  First, a discussion of the three different 
parental statuses, and how they are allocated, frames the basic concepts that 
are relevant to the paper.  Second, the various ways in which a child can have 
multiparents are illustrated.  Third, the question of why multiparents should 
be recognized is addressed.  Fourth, an analysis of the instances in which 
legislatures and courts have recognized multiparents to various degrees, 
focusing mainly on British Columbia, California, and England is undertaken.  
Lastly, a new approach to the recognition and regulation of multiparents is 
suggested, according to which allocation of parental status should be guided 
by the intended-parents’ intentions and the child’s best interests. 
                                                          
 6. These jurisdictions were chosen as they all allocate parental status to 
multiparents, but to different extents. In England, only parental responsibilities could be 
allocated to more than two individuals, based on the intentions of the holders of 
parenthood status. In contrast, both in California and in British Columbia can the 
parenthood status be awarded to more than two individuals. Yet, in California this 
process is regulated by the courts, whereas in British Columbia it is completely subject 
to the intentions of the multiparents. 
4
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II. DEFINING AND ALLOCATING PARENTAL STATUSES 
Traditionally courts and legislators maintained a strict division between 
those who can be legal parents and those who cannot.  By distinguishing 
between parents and strangers, the former were given exclusive status.7  
Moreover, this distinction has traditionally been instigated by, and 
consequently led to the replication of, the rule of two, which prescribes that 
only two individuals would have the legal status of parents at a given 
moment.8 
Two matters require our attention in order to proceed with the main thesis 
of this paper.  First, we must distinguish between the three legal parental 
statuses – ‘parentage’, ‘parenthood’, and ‘parental responsibilities’ – as these 
terms are crucial to the understanding of the core issues.  Second, we need 
to examine the five main approaches for allocation of legal parental status: 
marital presumption, psychological approach, functional approach, 
genetic/biological approaches, and intention-based approach. 
A. Parentage, Parenthood, and Parental Responsibilities 
As for the three parental statuses, it will be useful to turn to Andrew 
Bainham’s definitions.9  He defines ‘parentage’ as the socially perceived 
genetic link between the child and her parents.  It is the indicator of the 
child’s genetic origins, and as such it is set at the time of conception and is 
constant from that point on.10  Conversely, ‘parenthood’ is the continuing 
                                                          
 7. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000); X, Y & Z v. United Kingdom, 3 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 355 (1997) (De Meyer, J.) (“It is self-evident that a person who is 
manifestly not the father of a child has no right to be recognized as her father”); 
Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 5, at 879. 
 8. See Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989); In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 856, 861, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005); 
Deborah Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative 
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 379, 381 (2007); Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as 
Status and Rights: The Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to 
Disaggregate Family Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 129 (2010); Sacha 
M. Coupet, “Ain’t I a Parent?”: Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the Debate over 
Expansion of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 595, 595 (2010); Ann E. 
Kinsey, A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should Give 
Courts the Discretion To Find that a Child Has More than Two Legal Parents, 51 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 295, 330 (2014). 
 9. Andrew Bainham, Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, 
Elusive Yet Important Distinctions, in WHAT IS A PARENT? A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 
28-29 (1999). 
 10. See id. 
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relationship between a child and her social parents.11  Therefore, parenthood 
is a flexible definition; at one point in time a child can have X as a parent, 
and at another point in time Y might be the parent.  Lastly, Bainham defines 
‘parental responsibilities’ as “all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities 
and authority, which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child 
and his property,”12 which can be shared between an unlimited number of 
individuals, each having a degree of responsibility.13 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the definition of ‘parents’ is dependent 
upon the purpose of the investigation.  If it is conferring legal obligations, 
then parental responsibilities are sufficient.  However, if the legal status or 
genetic link go to the core of the investigation, then the ideas of parenthood 
and parentage should guide us.  The character of these definitions 
necessitates distinction between the two: parentage is factual; parental 
responsibilities are legal; and parenthood is both social and legal. 
B. Five Approaches to Parental Status Allocation 
In practice, parental status is conferred by relying upon the marital 
presumption, psychological approach, functional approach, 
genetic/biological approaches, or intention-based approach.14  These 
approaches are not necessarily applied in a way that maintains the theoretical 
rationales of the three parental statuses.  Nor are they necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  However, as I will show below, the intention-based approach 
most aptly captures the nature of the relationships in multiparental families.15  
Furthermore, parental intention has a role in most of the approaches for 
allocation of parental status. 
Take the marital presumption for example.  This presumption means that 
a child born in wedlock will be considered the husband’s child unless 
                                                          
 11. See id. at 44. 
 12. Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 3(1) (UK); cf. Children Act 1995, c. 36, § 1-2 (Scot.); 
Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 art. 41 (Can.); SONIA HARRIS-SHORT & JOANNA 
MILES, FAMILY LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 660 (2nd ed., 2011); ELAINE 
SUTHERLAND, J.K. MASON, & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, Is Anything Left of Parental 
Rights?, in FAMILY RIGHTS, FAMILY LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS (1990); Annette Ruth 
Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 
697 (2001); Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 5, at 880-81; Coupet, supra note 8, at 
614. 
 13. Bainham, supra note 9, at 44. 
 14. Wald, supra note 8, at 381. 
 15. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 
64(3) BUFF. L. REV. 465, 485-95 (2016) (discussing additional advantages of the intent-
based approach). 
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contradictory evidence exists.16  This is true even if the child was born only 
two weeks after the couple married.17  The existence of this presumption is 
rather unsurprising, since for many years family life could only exist within 
the framework of marriage,18 and other methods of determining parentage 
(like DNA testing) were not available.  By constructing this presumption, the 
law was able to protect the family from instability, and more importantly 
prevent the unwarranted status of “illegitimate children.”19   It is also the 
easier administrative choice, as it is a fairly simple bright-line rule.20 
Examining the marital presumption vis-à-vis the institution of marriage, 
as it was understood many centuries ago, suggests that this presumption 
made social and legal sense.  While initially marriage was perceived as a 
private matter of factual character (i.e., in order to be married a couple did 
not have to undergo a ceremony, but rather they needed to live together as 
man and wife), over the years the Church and Canon Law succeeded in 
assimilating their notions of marriage into social practice.21  Marriage 
became a public matter, regulated by the Church and the State, with legal 
consequences.  It also began being perceived as a civil contract,22 and in the 
heart of the agreement to marry was the purpose of having and raising 
children.23  In other words, by agreeing to enter into marriage, the husband 
and wife agreed to support and raise the children born from that marriage.  
The marital presumption was the means of enforcing this agreement, 
                                                          
 16. In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930); RCA 13/66 Plonit (minor) v. 
Ploni, PD 20(2) 512, 515-16 (1966) (Isr.); Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: 
An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495, 498-99 (1993). 
 17. Katharine Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity 
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 23 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bargaining or Biology?]. 
 18. Jens Scherpe, Protection of Partners in Informal Long-Term Relationships 7(3) 
INT’L L. FORUM DU DROIT INT’L 206, 207 (2005). 
 19. Bargaining or Biology?, supra note 17, at 6. 
 20. Rita Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three – or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining 
the Family after the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231, 242 (2000). 
 21. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 27-28 (1989). 
 22. Goodright v. Moss (1777), 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1257 (KB); Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888); 46 Martin Luther et al., Martin Luther’s Works, 261-62 (1986); 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003); Richard F. 
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional 
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 597, 640-42 (2002). 
 23. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 443 (1796); 
Bargaining or Biology?, supra note 17, at 24. 
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regardless of genetic connection to the father.24  From this perspective the 
marital presumption is not an arbitrary rule, but a manifestation of the 
husband and wife’s intentions.  Only when it was proven that these intentions 
were not upheld within the marriage, could the presumption fail.  Thus, it is 
clear that intent has a role in the marital presumption.  This is not to say that 
such intent necessarily exists in each and every marriage today.  It is merely 
the presumption that is based on the assumption that such intent exists. 
That said, with more children being born outside wedlock and rising 
divorce rates, it has been suggested that the substance of family life, rather 
than the form, should have legal consequences.25  Put differently, the 
parenting functions and perceptions should have meaning, not the legal 
status of the family members in relation to each other. 
One method of evaluating the substance of family life as an indicator for 
conferring parental rights and responsibilities is the functional approach.  
According to this approach, the courts should recognize an individual as a 
parent if she acted as one in a regular way.26  This could be done by 
considering the different elements in the day to day family life, such as 
whether the adult and child live together, if the former assumed parental 
obligations without expecting financial compensation, the length of time and 
intensity of the parent-like relationship, and the formation of reliance or 
dependence.27 
As the definition of this approach suggests, functional parenting is a 
voluntary matter.  A person must act intentionally as a parent for a significant 
period of time in order to be recognized as a parent; and the more 
                                                          
 24. Bargaining or Biology?, supra note 17, at 24. 
 25. Leslie J. Harris, Reconsidering Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 461 UTAH L. REV. 
461, 482 (1996); see generally Bridge, supra note 2; ERIC CLIVE, Marriage: An 
Unnecessary Legal Concept?, in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETIES 71 (1980). 
 26. Melanie Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal 
Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 433, 435 (2005) [hereinafter Applying Intent-
Based Parentage]. 
 27. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005); Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A.2d 
634, 634-36 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); C.C.A. v. J.M.A., 744 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1999); Wade v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Wright 
v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. 1996); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 
2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005); In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995); Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the 
Numbers: Should Only Two Always Do, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 29-33 (2008); Nancy 
D. Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes How Many – Using In re M.C. to Consider 
Parentage of a Child Conceived through Sexual Intercourse and Born to a Lesbian 
Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015, 2032-2033 (2012) [hereinafter Response: And Baby Makes]. 
8
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responsibilities taken the more likely it is that the court will give a legal 
consequence to these actions.  Hence, it is fair to argue that the functional 
approach has a strong element of intention.28  Indeed, it is not common to 
find a situation in which an individual is acting like a parent without the 
intent to perform as one.  Of course, if a person is compelled to fulfill some 
parental roles by matter of law, it is possible that the intent to perform as a 
parent will be lacking.  However, these situations occur a posteriori to the 
recognition of parenthood and parental responsibilities, so they are irrelevant 
in this respect for the purposes of this paper. 
An interesting issue, which arises in the context of the functional 
approach, is that of recognition of parental responsibilities by implicit 
contract.  At times, courts apply the functional approach in order to identify 
a contract-like obligation to assume parental responsibilities.29  Here, the 
intent is not merely an underlying principle, but the focal point of the 
proceedings.  By borrowing notions from contract law, acting as a parent 
indicates to the court the intent to assume parental responsibilities.  Once 
more it is visible that intent is a cardinal factor in the functional approach. 
Another method of evaluating the substance of family life as an indicator 
for conferring parental rights and responsibilities is the psychological 
approach.30  Once more, the parenting functions are a proxy for the 
recognition of parenthood and allocation of parental responsibilities.  
However, the emphasis lies on the perception of the adults and children, and 
whether they see themselves as a family and identify as parents and children.  
This self-perception and identification could have direct manifestation (the 
child calls an individual her “mom” or “dad”), and indirect manifestations 
(the individuals fulfill parental roles, like doing the laundry, taking the child 
to the doctor, etc.).  They do not need to live in the same house for such 
identification and attachment to occur.31  Yet, they do need to have a 
                                                          
 28. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696; Applying Intent-Based Parentage, supra note 27, 
at 437-38; Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood 
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-traditional Families, 
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 464 (1990) [hereinafter Two Mothers]; Storrow, supra note 22 at 640-
42; Katharine K. Baker, Quacking Like A Duck? Functional Parenthood Doctrine and 
Same-Sex Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 145-60 (2017). 
 29. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); RCA 8256/99 
Plonit v. Ploni, PD 58(2) 213, 233-36 (2003) (Isr.); Bargaining or Biology?, supra note 
17, at 31. 
 30. Storrow, supra note 22, at 640-42. 
 31. ALLISON JAMES, Parents: A Children’s Perspective, in WHAT IS A PARENT? A 
SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 190 (1999); cf. Irene Levin, Children’s Perceptions of Their 
Family, in CHILDHOOD AND PARENTHOOD: PROCEEDINGS OF ISA COMMITTEE FOR 
9
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continuing mutual relationship, which fulfils the child’s psychological and 
physical needs.32 
Again, it is possible to see how intent has a meaningful role.  Although the 
psychological approach is focused on feelings and emotions, it does not 
overlook the actions that caused them, which are used as objective 
indications of the existence of a psychological connection.  These actions are 
very similar to those that are examined in the functional approach.  
Therefore, here too it will be hard to find cases in which a person will act as 
a parent without the intention of doing so.  Indeed, it might be even harder, 
because the focus is on the creation of deep feelings and emotions, and not 
just function.  Hence, intent is a cardinal aspect of the psychological 
approach as well.33 
While the marital presumption, functional, and psychological approaches 
maintain the distinction between the notions of parentage and parenthood, 
the genetic/biological approaches conflates them as they allocate parenthood 
according to parentage.  The genetic approach focuses on the genetic 
contribution to the child’s DNA.  The biological approach adds another 
layer, and considers not just DNA but also general biological contribution to 
the child’s birth.  In this sense, the genetic parents can also be described as 
the biological parents, but the reverse is not necessarily true.  Hence, it seems 
that the main contribution of the biological approach is in its use in assisted 
reproductive technologies (“ART”), where there is a need to distinguish 
between the genetic parents and the gestational parent.34  Even when the 
latter has no genetic relation to the child, s/he could be considered as a 
biological parent. 
Both the genetic and biological approaches provide a bright-line rule that 
ensures that every child has at least two parents.35  The sources of this rule 
have various origins.  For instance, in England it could be traced to the 
British Poor Laws, allowing reimbursement from fathers whose children 
                                                          
FAMILY RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 281-83 (Julia Brannen & 
Margaret O’Brien eds., 1994). 
 32. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (2nd ed., 1979); Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 5, at 
883, 944-48. 
 33. Charo, supra note 20, at 246. 
 34. See id. (noting in this context that the term “parent” is used, and not mother, as 
in some cases involving transgender, transsexual or intersex individuals it would be 
inaccurate to simply describe the genetic and gestational parent as a mother). 
 35. Bionormativity, supra note 5, at 653. 
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received financial assistance.36  Contrastingly, in the U.S. some states used 
paternal support as punishment for bastardy or fornication.37  In both 
countries, it seems, intent was not a consideration in the recognition of 
parenthood and parental obligations.  This is true to this day.  Since genetics 
and biology are the sole indicators used to determine parenthood and parental 
rights in these approaches, intent serves no purpose in them.  Indeed, an 
individual could be a genetic or a biological parent without intending to 
become one, for example, if birth control measures failed.  Furthermore, 
when these approaches are applied intent is not examined.  So even if one 
could argue that intent exists post-conception by choosing not to have an 
abortion, it is supposedly irrelevant, notwithstanding that only the gestational 
parent has the power to abort. 
Lastly, in some instances parental status is allocated according to the 
intention-based approach.  This approach is rather straightforward: parental 
status is determined according to the individual’s intention to assume such a 
role.  However, unlike the previous approaches, in which intention was a 
factor but it was not necessarily examined to determine parental status, here 
intentions are considered directly.  This approach is mainly applied to 
determine parenthood and parental responsibilities in cases of assisted 
reproduction.38  For instance, in some jurisdictions if a woman consents to 
her partner’s insemination she will be that child’s parent if she initially 
intended to be the parent.39  Similarly, some courts have ruled that a sperm 
donor is the child’s father by means of apparent consent.40 
The table below aids in clarifying the relationship between the methods of 
allocating parental statuses, and the statuses themselves.  It shows that if the 
marital presumption, genetic or biological approaches are used, then 
parentage will be conferred, and consequently parenthood status and/or 
parental responsibilities might also be allocated.  In contrast, if the 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 657-58. 
 37. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 109 (1971). 
 38. JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY 239-43 (1997); Bargaining or 
Biology?, supra note 17, at 26-30; Applying Intent-Based Parentage, supra note 26, 437-
48; Storrow, supra note 22, at 640-42. 
 39. Cf. D.C. CODE §16-909(e)(1) (2016); N.M STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (2009); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.710 (2011); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M, 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Mass. 1999); In re Karin T. v. Michael T., 
484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985); Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2009); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1316 (Pa. Super 1996); RFA 4890/14 
Plonit v. Plonit (2014) (Nevo) (Isr.). 
 40. See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 27, 35 (Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 
821, 821-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
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psychological, functional, or intention-based approaches are used, then only 
parenthood status and/or parental responsibilities will necessarily be 
awarded.  Lastly, the table illustrates that intent is or was an integral part of 
the marital presumption, psychological, functional, and intention-based 
approaches, and is non-existing in the genetic and biological approaches. 
 
Status Allocation 
Method Parental Status Conferred Intent 
Marital 
Presumption 
Necessarily: parentage 
Consequently: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities 
Historical/Tacit 
Psychological  Necessarily: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities Tacit 
Functional  Necessarily: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities Tacit 
Genetic  Necessarily: parentage 
Consequently: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities 
None 
Biological  Necessarily: parentage 
Consequently: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities 
None 
Intention-Based  Necessarily: parenthood and/or parental responsibilities Explicit 
III. WHO COULD BE MULTIPARENTS? 
Multiparental family structures are of a diverse nature.  Some 
multiparental family structures are a consequence of new reproductive 
technologies, others of new social and legal practices, while some 
multiparental structures come in old and familiar forms.  Moreover, 
multiparents can be found in both heterosexual and LGBT headed families.  
The following subsections will present the five main multiparental family 
structures: ART, co-parenting, stepfamilies, open adoptions, and extended 
kinship care. 
In this respect three issues are noteworthy.  First, the following subsections 
describe who can be considered as multiparents from a social perspective, 
not according to existing legislation or case law.  The question of who should 
be recognized as multiparents, and who are indeed recognized as 
multiparents under the law, will be discussed later. 
Second, multiparental families could be of a hierarchal or egalitarian 
parental status character.  For instance, in open adoption and kinship carers 
it is more likely to find a division between the “core” parents, who take an 
active role most of the time, and “secondary” parents.  In contrast, co-
parenting could lead to an egalitarian division of parental care. 
Third, we must keep in mind that the multiparental family structures 
described below might not be distinct, and that some overlapping may occur.  
For example, there is the possibility that alongside the parents who used 
assisted reproductive technologies we can identify adoptive parents and co-
parents.  However, in the context of the following subsections I will illustrate 
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who are the potential multiparents while disregarding possible overlaps 
unless they are unavoidable.  With these remarks in mind, we can move to 
discuss the various categories of multiparental families. 
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology Families 
The first type of multiparental structures is that of families that are 
established through the use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”).  
This term refers to many different types of assisted reproductive treatments, 
ranging from fertility medication, through some form of handling sperm and 
eggs (such as artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization (“IVF”), and 
surrogacy), to selection and manipulation of the genetic material.  Not all 
ART treatments lead to a possibility of multiparents.  If there are only two 
intended parents who are the sole providers of the genetic material, and one 
of the intended parent is also the gestational parent, then theoretically there 
should only be two parents – much like unassisted reproduction. 
However, ART is complex by its nature, and therefore it is a fertile 
environment in which the multiparents phenomenon can occur.  In some 
cases, the intended parents require sperm or egg donation, or the help of a 
surrogate mother.  Here the intended parents might not both be the genetic 
parents, or there may be another biological parent (i.e. the surrogate) 
alongside the two genetic parents.  Additionally, there might be more than 
two intended parents, e.g. when a lesbian couple decide to have a child with 
a known sperm donor who takes an active role in the child’s life.  But there 
might even be cases in which there are three genetic parents.  Since the 
1990s, scientists have been successful in using ooplasm transfer41 and 
mitochondrial replacement42 in ART.43  These procedures involve using 
genetic materials from three different people – the sperm donor, the healthy 
egg donor, and the damaged egg donor – and they can require the help of a 
surrogate.  Consequently, children who are born via this procedure will have 
three genetic parents and potentially an additional biological parent.  Thus, 
in theory, children born in such circumstances can have multiparents. 
                                                          
 41. Injecting a small amount of ooplasm from eggs of fertile women to the eggs of 
unfertile women. See Jacques Cohen et al., Ooplasmic Transfer in Mature Human 
Oocytes, 4 MOLECULAR HUM. REPROD. no. 3, 1998, at 269-80. 
 42. Replacing damaged mtDNA with healthy mtDNA. See Françoise Baylis, The 
Ethics of Creating Children with Three Genetic Parents, 26 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE 
ONLINE 531, 531-32 (2013). 
 43. Recently, England advanced a new regulation that will allow mitochondrial 
donations, but it will only recognize two legal parents. See The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015, SI 572, art. 3, ¶ 15, 17 (Eng.). 
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B. Co-Parenting Families 
The second type of multiparental structure is co-parenting.  The term ‘co-
parenting’ describes a situation in which individuals jointly raise children 
without being in a romantic or legally recognized relationship.  Such 
arrangements occur either after spousal separation, or as a result of a choice 
to raise children without prior or subsequent romantic involvement. It is 
important to note in this context that co-parenting is used by members of the 
LGBTQ community and heterosexuals as individuals, as couples, or in other 
combinations.  In the latter case there are more than two individuals 
involved.  Thus, according to the intention-based, functional, or 
psychological approaches, the child could have multiparents, and the number 
of family members and complexity of the family structure can vary 
considerably. 
For example, assume Adam and Brian are a gay couple who decide to have 
a child with Christina using Adam’s sperm.  The three agree on the various 
issues regarding childrearing, from the child’s name, custody arrangements, 
and financial support, up to breakup or new relationships.  As a result, Dorian 
is born.  He spends half of his week with Adam and Brian, and the other half 
with Christina, and alternates between the two homes every other weekend.  
After a year Christina falls in love and marries Eliot, and together they have 
Fiona.  All four adults take an active role in raising the two children, which 
now have three fathers and one mother.  Although this example can be 
developed even further,44 it is sufficiently established for our purposes.  We 
can now see that co-parenting does not only illustrate how “it takes a village 
to raise a child”,45 but also that it sometimes creates the village. 
C. Stepfamilies 
The third type of structure is stepfamilies.  As aforementioned, in some 
instances after spousal breakup one or both of the parents meet new spouses, 
who participate in the day-to-day upbringing of the children.  Here there 
might be a positive cooperation between the “original” parents and the “new” 
parents.46  In this case the parental responsibilities will be shared according 
                                                          
 44. See generally JOHN EEKELAAR, Parenthood, Social Engineering and Rights, in 
CONSTITUTING FAMILIES: A STUDY IN GOVERNANCE 83 (Derek Morgan et. al. eds., 1994); 
Annemarie Vaccaro, Toward Inclusivity in Family Narratives: Counter-Stories from 
Queer Multi-Parent Families, 6(4) J. GLBT FAM. STUD., 425, 429-32 (2010). 
 45. See generally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (Simon & 
Schuster, 1996). 
 46. I use the terms “original” and “new” parents to distinguish between the 
individuals that were initially legally recognized as the parents and the new spouses who 
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to some sort of an agreement between the parents.  But it may very well be 
that an “original” parent will not take an active role in the child’s life, and 
the “new” parent will assume that role.  Whichever situation may apply, the 
fact that the new spouses fulfil parental roles can lead to a situation where 
the child has multiparents. 
D. Open Adoption Families 
The fourth structure is open adoptions.  The way an adoption is 
categorized determines whether the child might have multiparents.  A closed 
adoption is supposed to sever all ties – legal and social – between the 
“original” parents and the child.47  Therefore, in most cases of closed 
adoptions a child will have two parents at most at any given time.  In an open 
adoption, however, there can be various degrees of relationship between the 
“original” parents and the child, from unilateral transmission of information 
to the “original” parents, through some form of visitation, to the existence of 
some parental rights and responsibilities of the “original” parents.48  It is in 
the latter situation where there is a potential for multiparenting.  It is also 
important to note that in very few and rare cases there have been reports of 
three adoptive parents, both in closed and open adoptions.49  In these cases it 
is clear that we are dealing with multiparents. 
E. Kinship Carer Families 
The fifth and last type of multiparental family structures is extended 
kinship carers.  As their title suggests, extended kinship carers are either 
members of the extended family or other friends who share a close and 
intimate relationship with the family.  The care is a result of voluntary 
agreement between the parents and the carers.  The care is provided with no 
expectation of monetary compensation and the extended kinship carers may 
be, inter alia, grandparents, godparents, aunts and uncles, friends, neighbors, 
                                                          
take on parental responsibilities. 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7660-7666 (West 2017); Adoption Act, R.S.C. 
1996, c. 38 (Can.); Adoption & Children Act 2002, c. 46, (Eng.). 
 48. See, e.g., Adoption Act, R.S.C. 1996, c. 38 (Can.); Down Lisburn Health and 
Soc. Servs. Tr. v. H, [2006] UKHL 36 (Eng); Children Adoption Act 5741-1981 § 16 (1) 
(Isr.); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 424 (2008). 
 49. Samantha Brennan & Bill Cameron, How Many Parents Can a Child Have? 
Philosophical Reflections on the “Three Parents Case”, in SELECTED WORKS OF 
SAMANTHA BRENNAN 14-15 (Western University ed. 2013); Nancy Polikoff, A Mother 
Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian 
Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 243 (2009). 
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and tribe members.50  These carers can, in certain situations, may be 
considered parents alongside the “original” parents. 
IV. WHY SHOULD MULTIPARENTS BE RECOGNIZED? 
So far, the paper has reviewed the three parental statuses, the approaches 
for their allocation, and who could be multiparents.  But before proceeding 
any further, it is important to address a debatable aspect of this paper, which 
is why multiparents should be recognized.  In this section the arguments 
opposing recognition of multiparents will be examined and refuted.  These 
arguments could be generally divided into three categories: inducing heavy 
strain on the administrative system, infringing on the idea of the family as an 
institution, and endangering the child’s best interests.  All three arguments 
share one main fault.  They all promote an approach of total non-recognition 
of multiparents, but the justifications they provide do not support this 
absolute stance.  Even if we were to say that these arguments have some 
merit, their internal logic does not exclude the recognition of multiparents as 
an exception to the general rule.  Hence, the main purpose of these arguments 
– total non-recognition of multiparents – could not be supported by them. 
A. Administrative Strain? 
The first strain of arguments opposing the recognition of multiparents 
suggests that with the recognition of any additional parent, beyond the 
traditional two, greater administrative strain is induced.51  This strain could 
be described as direct if, for example, multiparents will impose a greater 
burden on the courts when settling conflicts regarding such matters as 
custody, visitation, and financial support.52  Yet, it could also be described 
as indirect.  If the recognition of multiparents will make it easier for an 
individual parent “to shirk his or her responsibilities,”53 then the state might 
                                                          
 50. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a 
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 84 (2004); Vaccaro, supra note 44, 
at 432. 
 51. Marquardt, supra note 4; see generally Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005). 
 52. Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 635–36 (2002); June 
Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family 
Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2005); Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More 
Money: Reflections on the Financial Implications of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 217, 223 (2010) [hereinafter More Parents, More Money]; Marquardt, 
supra note 4; Wald, supra note 8, at 380-81. 
 53. Stanley Kurtz, Heather Has 3 Parents, NAT. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2003) 
www.nationalreview.com/article/206153/heather-has-3-parents-stanley-kurtz. 
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have to take over those responsibilities, or at the very least spend resources 
on their enforcement. 
However, it seems doubtful that the administrative strain imposed by 
multiparents is significantly more strenuous than that which is imposed on 
public authorities when dealing with any two-parent dispute.  Furthermore, 
even if multiparental family structure disputes are more complex, an issue 
that so far was not established empirically, this fact by itself does not justify 
non-recognition of multiparents in the first place.  In regards to custody 
disputes particularly, the difficulties arising cannot justify differential 
treatment between “traditional” and multiparental families.  Moreover, it is 
not at all clear that multiparenting makes it easier to shirk parental 
responsibilities.54  In fact, multiparents might require less state intervention 
than two parents and single parents for two reasons. First, the former can 
self-enforce each other’s parental obligations.55 Second, the larger number 
of individuals that are responsible for a child make it less likely that the state 
will need to support her.56 
B. Protecting the “Traditional” Family? 
The second strain of arguments opposing the recognition of multiparents 
claims that this recognition will undermine the “traditional” understandings 
of the family as an institution.57  The fear is that the “traditional” family will 
lose its social and legal dominance.  For instance, once the multiparental 
relationship between the parents and the children is recognized, then the 
parents will push for “the rights and protections of marriage.”58  
Alternatively, the protection of the “traditional” family as a whole and 
complete unit could be compromised.  It was argued that by the ability to 
recognize multiparents the family members’ right to privacy and autonomy 
could be compromised, as courts could use their power to “force” an 
additional parent on the family.59 
                                                          
 54. Brian Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or More) Parents, MINN. LEGAL STUDIES 
RESEARCH PAPER No. 08-22, 3 (2008). 
 55. See Vaccaro, supra note 44, at 434 (highlighting the testimony of one 
multiparent). 
 56. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 27 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 47, 72 
(2007); Kinsey, supra note 8. 
 57. Duncan, supra note 2, at 77; Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique 
of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 
1189, 1228-33 (2001). 
 58. Marquardt, supra note 4. 
 59. Appleton, supra note 27, at 29-30; Bix, supra note 54, at 6-7; Diane M. 
Goodman, Why Can’t Children Have Three Parents, 34 L.A. LAW. 36 (2011); John De 
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Still, there is no reason to believe that the survival of the “traditional” 
family is dependent on the non-recognition of multiparental families, just as 
it was not dependent on (or affected by) recognition of single-parent and 
same-sex families.60  Moreover, there might not be any value worth 
maintaining in the “traditional” family structure itself.61  Furthermore, it is 
not uncommon for children today to live outside the nuclear family, or in a 
family structure that does not include two parents;62 notwithstanding a 
growing trend of a kinship network made of several households, which take 
part in child rearing.63  This indicates that the “traditional” family ideal is far 
from how it is practiced in real life.  Additionally, arguing that recognizing 
multiparents will encourage the recognition of polyamorous or polygamous 
relationships is both baseless and ignorant of the nature of multiparental 
families.64  These structures are of a diverse nature, yet they are almost 
always composed of individuals who are not all involved in a romantic 
relationship.65  Non-recognition of all multiparental families due to the fear 
that a very small minority of them will pursue additional rights seems 
disproportional and ill-informed.  Lastly, regarding the courts infringement 
of the privacy and autonomy of the family unit, this is not a novel notion.  
First, privacy and autonomy should not be used as an a priori reason for not 
recognizing multiparents, as such reasoning could not be justified.  Rather, 
they should be balanced against other rights and interests, in accordance with 
the unique circumstances of each case.  Second, if individuals choose to form 
                                                          
Witt Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation Rights of Adult Outsiders, 
36 FAM.  L.Q. 163, 184-87 (2002); Fiona Kelly, Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families? 
Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law, 
21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 133, 172 (2004); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of 
Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood 
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 126-32 (2006). 
 60. Nancy Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FEMINIST STUD. 231, 
223-24 (2007) [hereinafter Dowd 2007]; Nancy Dowd, Law, Culture and Family: The 
Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law. 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 785, 786 
(2002); see generally Yoav Dotan, The Boundaries of Social Transformation through 
Litigation: Women’s and LGBT Rights in Israel, 1970-2010, 48(1) ISR. L. REV. 3 (2015). 
 61. See generally GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 227–306 (1981); 
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992); MARTHA. A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
 62. Kessler, supra note 56, at 53; Hannah Richardson, Nuclear Family ‘In Decline’, 
Figures Show, BBC NEWS, (July 2, 2010) www.bbc.co.uk/news/10487318. 
 63. Kessler, supra note 56, at 59. 
 64. Kinsey, supra note 8, at 335. 
 65. See generally Vaccaro, supra note 44, at 434. 
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a multiparental family, then privacy and autonomy justify its recognition. 
C. The Child’s Best Interests? 
The third strand of arguments against the recognition of multiparents 
focuses on the child’s best interests.  In cases involving multiparental 
recognition, the child’s best interests has played a significant role.66  As shall 
be demonstrated below, recognition of multiparents does not harm the 
child’s best interests a priori.  On the contrary, not recognizing multiparents 
as a general rule will seemingly have a negative effect. 
But first, it is important to define what the child’s best interests standard 
is.  The child’s best interests is considered to be a vague standard, which has 
the potential to be interpreted in many different ways.67  Thus, it is hard to 
extract one clear definition that will be applicable in various situations, let 
alone remain unchanged over time.68  However, despite the fact that there is 
no universal definition of this standard, some general observations can be 
made.  This standard has been interpreted as primarily concerning the child’s 
psychological interests, but there has also been consideration of other 
interests, such as economical, educational and medical needs.69  In this 
regard, courts have examined the level of attachment between the parent and 
the child, alongside the child’s perspective and wishes.70  Hence, an 
examination of the child’s best interests entails the same principles of the 
psychological and functional approaches, and if the child is old enough to 
express herself then the principles of the intention-based approach are also 
considered. 
                                                          
 66. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2017); A.A. v B.B. (2007), 83 O.R. 
3d 561 (Can. Ont.); A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 285 (Eng.); M.L. v. R.W. 
[2011] EWHC 2455 (Fam) (Eng.); Re W.B. (children) (contact) [2011] EWHC 3431 
(Fam) (Eng.); Re D (contact and parental responsibility: lesbian mothers and known 
father) [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) (Eng.); Coupet, supra note 8, at 595. 
 67. Katharine Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common 
Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute’s Family 
Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 11, 13 (2002). 
 68. Bionormativity, supra note 5, at 682; Dolgin, supra note 38, at 238-43; Naomi 
R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decision Making, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-14, 58 (1997). 
 69. Coupet, supra note 8, at 642; Robert Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child 
Custody Evaluations: Limited Science and a Flawed System, 6(1) PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. 
INT. 1, 6 (2005); cf. 2007 O.A.C. 2, 83 O.R. (3d) 561 (Can.); A v. B and Another [2012] 
EWCA Civ 285 (Eng.); [2011] EWHC 3431 (Fam) (Eng.); [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) 
(Eng.). 
 70. Coupet, supra note 8, at 642; cf. 2007 O.A.C. 2, 83 O.R. (3d) 561 (Can.); [2011] 
EWHC 3431 (Fam) (Eng.); [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) (Eng.). 
19
Abraham: A Family Is What You Make It?
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017
424 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 25:4 
 
With the complex nature of the “child’s best interests” standard in mind 
we can now turn to the main reservation that has been made in the context of 
recognizing multiparents.  It has been argued that due to the nature of 
multiparenting households, there will be “too many cooks in the kitchen”, 
causing decision making to be extremely difficult.71  It has also been argued 
that the family will often include more than two households, shuffling the 
children between different homes and ideologies, forcing them to grow up 
too fast.72 
These arguments appear to assume that all multiparental families are 
necessarily dysfunctional.  But this assumption is far too wide and 
unsubstantiated.  In fact, multiparental families might not only work well 
despite having “many cooks”, but perhaps even better than families that only 
have two.  Furthermore, the claim that the mere existence of two homes in a 
child’s life causes distress is an ungrounded and unproven presumption, not 
to mention that “traditional” families are not the ideal stress-free single-
ideology households they are portrayed as.  Notwithstanding the fact that 
multiparenting can take place in a single household73 (even if not all parents 
live there), having more than one home could be a positive experience. 
A child’s best interests may be served by recognition of multiparents for 
two main reasons.  First, without such recognition the family unit is 
vulnerable with many issues left uncertain, such as custody, citizenship, 
holding and succession of property, social support, and legitimacy.74  Not 
                                                          
 71. Buss, supra note 52, at 635–36; Carbone, supra note 52, at 1297; More Parents, 
More Money, supra note 52, at 223; Kinsey, supra note 8, at 329; Marquardt, supra note 
4. 
 72. Marquardt, supra note 4, at 1. 
 73. Vaccaro, supra note 44, at 429. 
 74. Nicholas Bamforth, Same-Sex Partnerships: Some Comparative Constitutional 
Lessons, 12 EUR. HUM.  RTS. L. REV. 47, 60 (2007); Kinsey, supra note 8, at 329-37; 
Kavanagh, supra note 50, at 90; FA (Tel-Aviv) 37745-03-14 Nilli v. Orit, NEVO, at 1 
(Apr. 27, 2014) (Isr.). In Nilli, a family court in Israel gave effect to a co-parenting 
agreement and ordered visitation rights to Nilli, who donated her eggs to her lesbian 
partner Orit, which were fertilized with Alon’s sperm. Orit and Alon were registered as 
the parents on the birth certificate, and the three signed a co-parenting agreement in 
which they declared they will act as equal parents despite the lack of formal legal 
recognition of Nilli as a parent. After Nilli and Orit’s relationship ended, Nilli continued 
seeing the children and assisting in their daily care, until Orit and Alon stopped the 
visitations. The court recognized the lacuna in current legislation regarding multiparents, 
and declared it would be unreasonable to ignore the parties’ co-parenting agreement. The 
court added that not recognizing this agreement will not only harm the parties, but that it 
is also contradictory to the children’s best interests, legal stability and certainty. Yet, the 
court only ordered visitations and did not recognize Nilli’s parenthood. 
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recognizing multiparents therefore works against the child’s best interests 
while preserving the ideal of the hetero-normative monogamous family.75  
Second, in some circumstances, non-recognition of multiparents may result 
in the child going into foster care – which is doubtfully in the child’s best 
interest.76  It is safe to assume that any child will be better off with the person 
who has been parenting her than to go through foster care and adoption. 
Considering the above, arguing that as a general rule, multiparental 
families should not be recognized, or that the child’s best interests negate the 
possibility of recognizing multiparents in every circumstance, seems far-
fetched.  There is no inherent disadvantage in the recognition of 
multiparents.77  Furthermore, it is not only the hallmark of democratic 
societies, but also their duty, to accommodate the needs of different lifestyles 
“in a reasonable and fair manner.”78  As such, societies should strive to 
ensure that the best interests of the child do not become a tool for conforming 
all families to the “perfect” family ideal, but rather to provide equal 
protection of various forms of families.  In the following section the manner 
in which such recognition currently takes place will be examined. 
V. THE SPECTRUM OF RECOGNITION AND REGULATION: FROM SOCIAL 
LABEL TO LEGAL STATUS 
In recent years, the strict divide between ‘parents’ and ‘strangers’ has been 
eroding.  With such notions as presumed parents, in loco parentis, de facto 
parents, and parents by estoppel, courts and legislatures recognize 
individuals who fulfill the role of a parent and have some, if not all, parental 
rights and responsibilities.79  More significantly, there is a growing trend of 
                                                          
 75. See Two Mothers, supra note 28, at 573 (explaining that family law still often 
fails to recognize and protect the child-carers relationships despite the fact such 
recognition is in the child’s best interests, as she comes to depend on and attached to the 
carers); Laura Ann Rosenbury, Rights and Realities, 94 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 39, 43 (2008); 
Coupet, supra note 8, at 321. 
 76. Kinsey, supra note 8, at 331. 
 77. See generally A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA (Civ) 285, 285 (Eng.). 
 78. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie [2006] 1 S.A. 524, at 95 (S. Afr.). 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. t.13, § 8-201 (2009); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2012); Elisa B. 
v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664-65 (Cal. 2005); Adoption of Kelsey S, 823 P.2d 
1216, 1217 (Cal. 1992); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); 
Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 
1146, 1152 (Me. 2004); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 
A.2d 913, 916-19 (Pa. 2001); Re PC (Change of Surname) [1997] 2 FLR 730 (Eng.); 
MARIEL DIMSEY, Multi-Parent Families in the 21st Century, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 
IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 101, 108-09 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2008). 
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allocation of parental statuses for more than two parents.80 
The allocation of parental status to multiparents by courts and legislatures 
is not binary, but rather could be described as a spectrum.81  On one side of 
the spectrum there are individuals who are considered complete strangers.  
Then, there are those who enjoy the social label of “parents” without legal 
consequences attached.82  Further along are those who have parental 
                                                          
 80. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2017) (allowing for the recognition of 
more than two parents when not doing so would be detrimental to the child); see also 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853 (2015) (granting courts the authority to recognize 
more than two parents); see also Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 § 44 (Can.) 
(permitting “two or more of a child’s guardians [to] make an agreement respecting . . . 
the allocation of parental responsibilities . . . “); see also Care of Children Act (2004) § 
23 (N.Z.) (allowing parental guardians to appoint additional guardians for a child); see 
also State of La. ex rel. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., Off. of Fam. Support v. Howard, 898 So.2d 
443, 444; (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the concept of dual paternity, where a 
child is allowed to seek support from its biological father); see also Smith v. Cole, 553 
So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (holding that even if a child already has a guardian, that does 
not mean that the biological father can escape his parental responsibilities); see also Geen 
v. Geen, 666 So.2d 1192, 1196-97 (La. Ct. App. 3d. Cir. 1995) (holding that biological 
parents are not the default option when determining the best interests of a child, even 
when they get married); see also State ex rel. Crook v. Mendoza, 491 N.W.2d 62, 6364 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the relationship between the biological father and the 
custodial father and how both can be required to support the child); see also Jacob v. 
Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 480-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (discussing the idea that 
“stepparents who have held a child out as their own are liable for support; biological 
parents who have exercised the rights appurtenant to that status can be no less bound.”); 
see also A.A. v B.B. (2007), 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can. Ont.) (recognizing that a child can 
have two fathers, two mothers, or any combination thereof); see also McAllister v. 
McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658, 660 (N.D. 2010) (holding that the best interest of the 
child was to allow visitation rights by a third parent); see also K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 
975, 981-82 (N.J. App. Div. 2014) (recognizing that a child’s best interests might involve 
more than two parents); see also Dawn M. v. Michael M., 55 Misc.3d 86547865, 47 
N.Y.S.3d 898, 900-02 (N.Y.S. Suffolk County 2017) (holding that “tri-custody” was in 
the best interests of the child); see also In re Parentage of J.B.R Child, 336 P.3d 648, 654 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that multiple parents can be in the best interest of the 
child); see also Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 711 N.W.2d 759, 773-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (recognizing the rights of biological and psychological parents); see generally 
COMMON CORE AND BETTER LAW IN EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW 389-412 (Katharine Boele-
Woelki ed., 2005); KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
FAMILY LAW REGARDING PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 32, 66 (2007). 
 81. Meyer, supra note 59, at 131-32; Murray, supra note 48, at 398-99; Barbara 
Bennet Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parent’s 
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1781-82 (1993). 
 82. E.g. A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 285 (Eng.). 
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responsibilities, but the legal status of parenthood is not conferred to them.83   
This instance along the spectrum indicates the point from which legal 
rights and obligations are conferred.  Closer to the other end of the spectrum 
are individuals who are awarded the legal status of parenthood, but do not 
have full parental responsibilities.84  Finally, there are those who hold both 
parental responsibilities and the status of parenthood.85 
                                                          
 83. See id. (providing an example of England sperm donors being recognized as 
having limited parental responsibilities stemming from their parenting, but their 
parenthood was not recognized as such); Re D (contact and parental responsibility: 
lesbian mothers and known father) [2006] EWCA Civ 285 (Fam) (Eng.); Re W.B. 
(children) (contact) [2011] EWHC 3431 (Fam) (Eng.). Conversely, in Louisiana, courts 
recognize “dual paternity”, where a child has both a presumed father and a biological 
father. Such dual recognition does not affect the presumed father status or 
responsibilities, while imposing financial responsibilities on the biological father (which 
may have some parental rights). State, Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. P.B. v. Reed, 10-410 
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2010) 52 So. 3d 145, 147; W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 2006-0702 (La. 3/6/07), 
951 So. 2d 172, 173; Howard, 898 So. 2d at 444; State, Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Office of 
Family Support ex rel. Munson v. Washington, 32,550 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99) 747 So. 
2d 1245, 1247; Cole, 553 So. 2d at 854-55; Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 813-814 
(La.1974). Multiparental recognition, which stems from the will to ensure financial 
security, can also be found in Israel. There the courts have found that if a stepparent died 
in the line of duty, the stepchild may be recognized as their orphan for the sake of 
receiving remuneration even if both biological parents are alive. i.e., for the purpose of 
remuneration, the children may have three parents.  SFA (District – Jerusalem) 1093/74 
Raya Kolan v. Remuneration Officer, 1976(2) 429 (1976) (Isr.); SFA (Magistrate – 
Rishon Letzion) 41988-03-11 R.A. v. Remuneration Officer Nevo (Feb. 3, 2013) (Isr.) 
 84. In Florida, a Miami-Dade Circuit Court judge ordered three parents to be 
registered as such on a birth certificate (the genetic parents and the lesbian partner of the 
genetic mother); notwithstanding, the court stated that the father will have only limited 
visitation rights and no other subsequent responsibilities. See Susan Brinkmann, Florida 
Allows Three Parent-Adoption, WOMEN OF GRACE (Feb. 13, 2013), www.
womenofgrace.com/blog/?p=19406. 
 85. For instance, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a child who was born 
to a lesbian couple and a known sperm donor has three parents, all of which have parental 
rights and responsibilities. This was made on the basis that one is the biological mother, 
her partner was the in loco parentis, and that equitable estoppel applies to the sperm 
donor in light of his involvement in the child’s life alongside his statutory liability as the 
biological father. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 776-77, 780-81. Perhaps a more ground-breaking 
case is A.A. v. B.B. in which a lesbian couple (A.A. and C.C.) together with a sperm 
donation from their friend (B.B.) had D.D. (2007), 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can. Ont.). Although 
the couple were to be the primary caregivers, the three wanted B.B. to remain involved 
in the child’s life. The Court of Appeal for Ontario stated that it is in the child’s best 
interests that all three adults enjoy an equal status of legal parenthood. 
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It is important to distinguish in this context between recognition of 
multiparents and their regulation.  These two terms are often conflated, and 
indeed they are fairly similar in content and character.  However, they have 
some unique features.  Recognizing multiparents requires the state to have a 
more passive role than regulating multiparents, as recognition reflects the 
individuals’ choices while regulation requires the state to act as an 
administrator that is constructing the family structure.  Consider the 
following example: Three individuals decide to be egalitarian multiparents 
of a child not yet conceived, meaning that they will all have parenthood 
status and equal parental responsibilities.  If upon birth all three are allocated 
this status (for example by registering them in the birth certificate as parents), 
then the state simply recognized the multiparents intentions.  If, however, in 
order to confer parental status, the multiparents have to go to court, and it 
has full discretion to decide if and what status will be conferred, then the 
state is regulating the establishment of the multiparental family. 
England is an exemplary jurisdiction which legally recognizes 
multiparents by allowing the simultaneous allocation of parental 
responsibilities to more than two individuals.86  However, it does not confer 
parenthood status to more than two individuals.  In the context of parenthood, 
a woman giving birth will be considered the mother, unless the child was 
adopted or a parental order was made.87  The legal father will be, in most 
cases, the genetic father.  Conversely, in ART, or if the birth mother is 
married, the legal father could be one of several: the husband, an agreed 
father who has no genetic link to the child nor is married to the mother, or 
even a second female parent and no father.88  Nonetheless, there could only 
be two individuals with parenthood status at most in any given moment.  
                                                          
 86. Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 2, 4ZA, 4A (Eng.). 
 87. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008), § 27(1), 33(1) (Eng.) 
[hereinafter HFEA]; Adoption & Children Act 2002, c. 38, § 14(Eng.); HARRIS-SHORT 
& MILES, supra note 12, at 589, 624; NIGEL LOWE, & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, BROMLEY’S 
FAMILY LAW 281 (2007). 
 88. HFEA §§ 35-47 (Eng.); Adoption & Children Act 2002, c. 46, (Eng.); §§ 50-51; 
HARRIS-SHORT & MILES, supra note 12, at 590, 626-30; LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 
87, at 248-51. 
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England’s policy of allocating parental responsibilities is a good example of 
catering for a hierarchal multiparental family structure where there are core 
and secondary parents. 
That said, the recognition of multiparents only occurs when all parents 
agree on each other’s parental status.  When parental status is disputed, the 
establishment of the multiparental family is regulated by courts and a 
hierarchal model is likely to be constructed.  One case that illustrates this 
point is Re D.  In this case, a lesbian couple (A and C) and a sperm donor 
(B) were all given parental responsibilities for the biological child of A and 
B. A has parenthood status and parental responsibilities because she is the 
biological mother, and C has them by means of a joint residence order.  B 
was granted limited parental responsibilities, and consequently the social 
“label” of a parent.  But he does not have the legal status of parenthood.  As 
Black J stated: 
 
As Mr. B expressly recognises, Ms. A and Ms. C are [the child’s] 
day to day parents and he has no role in her day to day care, whether 
in relation to decision making or otherwise.  He will, however, be 
kept informed of all major decisions taken by Ms. A and Ms. C in 
relation to her.  He will thus be recognised as a parent by the grant 
of parental responsibility but it will be a parent of a very different 
sort—no less important, just very different.89 
 
Despite Black J’s attempt to portray Mr. B’s status as equal to that of Ms. 
A and Ms. C, it is secondary to theirs.  It should be noted, that Re D is a case 
in which the court regulated the multiparental family rather than simply 
recognizing it.  This is mainly because A, B, and C were in disagreement 
about the scope of parental responsibilities B should hold.  If they were all 
in agreement then they could have applied for a court order, in which case 
the Court’s discretion would have been more limited. 
Similar issues arise in the A v. B case.90  Here, A offered to be the sperm 
donor for B and C, his lesbian friends (who were in a relationship).  Because 
B comes from a religious family, the three decided that it would be best if 
she, B, and A would marry, but that the child will be raised by B and C.  They 
also agreed that A’s fatherhood would be recognized, but that his parental 
role would be secondary.  After conception, cracks began to appear in the 
relationship of the three adults.  After M was born, A applied for a defined 
contact order, and B and C applied for a joint residence order and a specific 
                                                          
 89. See Re D [2006] EWCA Civ 285 (Fam) (Eng.). 
 90. A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 285 (Eng.). 
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issue order relating to A’s exercise of parental responsibility.  Again, we can 
see how the court was willing to confer parental status based on the 
hierarchal model.  Thorp LJ stated: 
 
[I]n the present case some would say that the primary carer is the full-time 
nanny.  However, let me rank the three parents in the context of care.  
Clearly, B and C are primary carers.  Clearly, A is only presently on the 
threshold of providing secondary care.91 
 
The English courts’ recognition and regulation of multiparental family 
structures according to a hierarchal model is not surprising.  As mentioned 
above, in England there could only be two holders of parenthood at any given 
moment.  This policy places the holder of the parenthood status in a superior 
position to any of the other parents for several reasons.  First, parental 
responsibilities are less permanent than parenthood, as they have an 
expiration date – when the child reaches majority and the parents lose their 
parental responsibilities.92  A similar result occurs if the child dies, is adopted 
or when a parental order is made.93  Contrastingly, parenthood could come 
to an end by means of adoption or parental order only.  Without such 
intervention, the familial link will always exist.  Second, the social parental 
label is arguably different.  Parenthood is a status only parents enjoy, 
whereas non-parents can potentially have parental responsibilities.  As such, 
although both legal instruments produce some sort of parenting status, the 
social value attached to each instrument is different – parenthood is more 
exclusive and coveted. 
California has taken an approach that differs from the English courts when 
allocating parental status to multiparents.  Section 7612(c) of the California 
Family Code allows courts to acknowledge multiparents when prescribing 
parental status to only two parents would be detrimental to the child.  Thus, 
under California law it is possible to have more than two individuals with 
parenthood status.94  According to the Bill introducing the new legislation: 
                                                          
 91. Id. 
 92. LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 87, at 391. 
 93. HFEA § 54 (Eng.); Adoption & Children Act 2002, c. 38, § 46. (Eng.); LOWE & 
DOUGLAS, supra note 87, at 431. 
 94. This legislation passed to abrogate In re M.C., in which the California Supreme 
Court held that the juvenile court erred when it failed to resolve the competing 
presumptions of three presumed parents (a biological mother, her lesbian partner, and 
the biological father) such that the child had only two legal parents. S.B. 274, 2013-14 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); see generally In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011). 
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Most children have two parents, but in rare cases, children have more than 
two people who are that child’s parent in every way . . .  It is the intent of 
the Legislature that this bill will only apply in the rare case where a child 
truly has more than two parents.95   
 
Hence, the courts do not simply recognize multiparents, they regulate 
them and have wide discretion over the decision whether to confer parental 
status or not.  Unlike the English legislation, it is not possible for the holders 
of parenthood status to agree to the allocation of parental responsibilities to 
other individuals.  These individuals can partake in the parenting enterprise, 
but their relationship with the children will receive limited legal protection 
at best.96  Therefore, California is a vivid example of jurisdictions that 
acknowledges only egalitarian multiparental families, in which all parents 
have the same legal parenthood status. 
There are several disadvantages to this form of regulation.  First, as the 
regulation of multiparents pivots on the courts’ application and interpretation 
of the term ‘detrimental’ in Section 7612(c) of the California Family Code, 
it is possible that such interpretation will be very strict and narrow, making 
the allocation of legal status to multiparental families all but impossible.97  
Second, if Bill 274’s approach is adopted, conferring parental status on 
multiparents may only be possible if the adults fit into the ideal of a 
heteronormative pattern of parenthood.  In this sense, multiparents will be 
awarded parental status only if they already share the parenting equally, live 
in the same house, etc.98  Future relationships, or non heteronormative 
                                                          
 95. See Cal. S.B. 274 (emphasis added).  
 96. Why Just Two?, supra note 5, at 325; Paula Roach, Parent-Child Relationship 
Trumps Biology: California’s Definition of Parent in the Context of Same-Sex 
Relationships, 43 CAL. W.L. REV. 235, 241 (2006); Michele Sacks Lowenstein and 
Elizabeth M. Brown, Step Parent Child Custody Rights, LOWENSTEIN BROWN (2015), 
www.lowensteinbrown.com/step-parent-rights-child-custody.php (last visited Apr. 25, 
2016). 
 97. Several cases suggest that the Californian courts might be heading toward a 
narrow interpretation, according to which only those situations in which a parental 
relationship is already formed, either in the form of psychological attachment or of 
functional care, it will be detrimental for the child that more than two parents will be 
recognized as such. See Martinez v. Vaziri, 246 Cal. App. 4th 373, 387-89 (2016); In re 
Alexander P., 1 Cal. App. 5th 1262, 1283-84 (2016); In re Donovan L. v. Shannon L., 
No. D068304, 2016 Cal. App. 4th LEXIS 105, *12 (Feb. 11, 2016); In re D.G. v. F.G., 
No. B258378, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2414, *6 (Apr. 16, 2015). However, it 
remains to be seen whether the courts will adopt this approach or diverge from it. 
 98. Notably, one court mentioned that an individual does not have to live with the 
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relationships, might not be given legal protection.  Such an approach does 
not accommodate all types of multiparental families.  For instance, it is 
unclear whether a stepparent will be awarded parenthood status alongside 
the “original” parents, as it is hard to say that stepparents fit the meaning of 
“rare cases” described in the Bill.  It could also be argued they are not “the 
child’s parents in every way”.  Perhaps this could only occur when the child 
has three genetic or biological parents.  Similarly, it is unclear whether 
secondary parenting will be perceived as fulfilling the requirement of being 
the child’s parent in every way, or that only primary parenting could qualify. 
A third example of a jurisdiction that legally acknowledges multiparents 
is British Columbia.  In the context of conferring parenthood status, it seems 
that British Columbia has gone even further than California as it allocates 
parental statuses based on parental agreements and hence recognizes 
multiparents rather than regulating them.  If there is a written agreement that 
is made before the child is conceived through ART, then the parenthood of 
all parties to such agreement will be recognized.99  British Columbia 
recognizes multiparental relationships that have not yet been constituted.  
There is no requirement of psychological attachment, or actual parental care.  
Rather, conferring parental status hinges purely on the intentions of the 
parents.  Therefore, on a spectrum varying from pure recognition of 
multiparents without any discretion on the part of the state, to strictly 
regulating multiparents with ultimate discretion to the state, British 
Columbia is closer to the former and California is closer to the latter. 
Nonetheless, British Columbia is closer than England to the regulating end 
of the spectrum in regards to allocation of parental responsibilities.  In 
general, parental responsibilities are only allocated to guardians, and 
guardians are generally only parents with recognized parenthood.100  
However, a person can become a child’s guardian, and thus gain parental 
responsibilities, if she is the child’s parent or by means of a court order.101  It 
is not possible to become a guardian by agreement unless such agreement is 
concluded between already recognized parents.102  In other words, there is a 
possibility to have more than two individuals with parental responsibilities 
simultaneously, but it is relatively heavily regulated. 
It is important to point out the advantages arising in this context.  
Recognition of multiparents is possible for both hierarchal and egalitarian 
                                                          
child to be considered as a parent. See In re Alexander P., 1 Cal. App. 5th at 1280. 
 99. Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 § 30 (Can.). 
 100. Id. §§ 39-40(2). 
 101. Id. §§ 50-51. 
 102. Id. § 50. 
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multiparental family structures, although it is done via two separate legal 
means.  Full parenthood, with registration of that status in an official registry, 
is possible only for multiparents who signed an agreement prior to the child’s 
conception, and the conception was achieved through ART.  Conversely, 
allocation of parental rights without parental status is achieved via 
guardianship.  Notably, the value of this status is debatable, as the scope of 
parental responsibilities could be limited by the guardians or the court.103 
Yet, there is one main disadvantage to the British Columbia model.  The 
requirements for recognition of parenthood – a written agreement, prior to 
conception, through ART – are too strict to cover all the instances in which 
multiparenting can occur.  For example, not all co-parenting agreements are 
written,104 nor are all of these arrangements “executed” via ART.  Putting it 
bluntly, some may prefer using a cup and syringe in their home,105 without 
understanding the legal implication of this form of insemination.  Hence, in 
the British Columbia model there was a clear choice of form over substance. 
As the above-mentioned examples show, while the concepts of parentage, 
parenthood, and parental responsibilities have traditionally identified only 
two parents, there is a growing trend of allocation of parental status to more 
than two adults.  Furthermore, it seems that although the treatment of 
multiparents varies from one jurisdiction to the next, from an empirical 
standpoint the allocation of parental responsibilities to more than two 
individuals is far more common106 than an explicit recognition of 
multiparents who have equal parenthood status.107  Moreover, in most cases 
in which multiparents were recognized, parental responsibilities were not 
allocated equally; there were the primary parents with full parental 
responsibilities and legally recognized parenthood, and secondary parents 
with limited responsibilities.108 
                                                          
 103. Id. §§ 44–45. 
 104. See, e.g., Re D (contact and parental responsibility: lesbian mothers and known 
father) [2006] EWCA (Fam) Civ 285 (Eng.); A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 285 
(Eng.); Re WB (children) (contact) [2011] EWHC (Fam) 3431 (Eng.). 
 105. Mali Kempner, Children Under Contract, (2012, 04:48), reshet.tv/Shows/
Hasipur/videomarklist,200555 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 106. See supra notes 79–82 (referencing the case in England, Israel, Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania). 
 107. See Brinkman, supra note 83; Brinkman, supra note 84 (noting the Miami ruling 
recognized three adults as having the same parenthood status, but not the same rights and 
responsibilities, whereas in Ontario and California full equal recognition was made 
possible). 
 108. See supra notes 81–83. 
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VI. RECOGNITION VS. REGULATION: SUGGESTION FOR NORMATIVE 
GUIDELINES 
In those jurisdictions where multiparents are legally acknowledged, the 
child’s best interests are the leading consideration when allocating parental 
status.  Yet, it is far too ambiguous to act as sole guiding principle.  That 
said, a bright-line rule should be avoided while striving to accommodate 
multiparental families, as it will ultimately lead to non-recognition of some 
of these family structures.  Therefore, the question remains – what should be 
the criteria for the recognition of multiparents? 
Katharine Bartlett argues that multiparents should be recognized if: (a) the 
parents are not married; (b) they initiate the relationship out of the child’s 
best interests; and (c) they fulfil the functional and psychological roles of 
parents.109  Her approach revolves more around the regulation of 
multiparental family structures than simply their recognition.  Bartlett 
supports legal acknowledgement of multiparents, but only for those who fit 
her criteria.  If this approach was adopted, a married lesbian couple could not 
be awarded parental status alongside the sperm donor, even if they intended 
the latter to take an equal parental role.  Thus, Bartlett’s approach fails to 
capture all multiparental family structures. 
Similarly, Alison Young argues that multiparents should have legal status, 
regardless of their marital status, but that parents must be divided into 
primary and secondary caretakers.110  This means that one or two primary 
caretakers will have parenthood status and full parental responsibilities, 
while the secondary caretakers will have only limited parental 
responsibilities.111  Hence, Young’s approach allows for more multiparental 
family structures to be acknowledged than Bartlett’s.  However, the 
distinction between primary and secondary carers is problematic.  First, it 
ignores family structures, in which the division of parental responsibilities is 
intentionally unequal.  Second, it echoes the gendered flaws of the 
                                                          
 109. See Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 5, at 944, 946, 948. 
 110. Alison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the 
Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 515-18 (1998). A similar 
argument is made by Jane Carbone and Naomi Cahn, who claim that there should be a 
presumption for a hierarchal multiparental family model that could be rebutted if there 
is a pre-birth agreement to have equal status coupled with post-birth equal sharing of 
child-raring burdens June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 46-7 (2017). 
 111. Similar approaches, which support recognition of multiparents only if a 
hierarchy of parental rights and responsibilities exist, have been argued by the following: 
Kavanagh supra note 50, at 95, 114-17; Bionormativity, supra note 5, at 655; Kessler, 
supra note 56, at 74-75; Why Just Two?, supra note 5, at 312-13, 334-35. 
30
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss4/2
2017] A FAMILY IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT? 435 
 
heterosexual family structure, in which women are the primary carers and 
men are the secondary carers.112  Third, even if there are primary and 
secondary carers, it does not mean that their rights and obligations should be 
different — as is the case in heteronormative family structures. 
The difficulties arising from a strictly hierarchal approach have led some 
scholars to suggest that we should strive to identify the family structure 
without conforming it to a specific ideal.113  By acknowledging both 
hierarchal and egalitarian multiparental family structures, the law could 
accommodate the wide range of multiparental families, thus ensuring 
equality, autonomy, and the child’s best interests.  Therefore, it is necessary 
and warranted that the approach through which parental status is allocated 
should be able to cater for the needs of the entire spectrum of multiparental 
families.  Thus, there should be no a-priori restriction on the form and 
substance of the multiparental family. 
Furthermore, examining the five approaches to the allocation of parental 
status suggests that only the intention-based approach can correctly capture 
all types of multiparental families.  The marital status approach and the 
genetic/biological approaches for allocation of parental status are out of sync 
with current social realities and medical advances.  Considering the vast 
numbers of children who are born out of wedlock, and the fact that not all 
couples can (or want to) marry, relying solely on the marital presumption 
seems unpractical and discriminative.114  Furthermore, ART and adoption 
illustrate that the fact that a genetic or biological connection exists between 
an individual and a child is not sufficient or necessary for the determination 
of parenthood and parental responsibilities.115  This does not mean genetics 
and biology should have no role at all, but in the context of multiparents they 
should not be the ultimate criteria. 
Similarly, the functional and psychological approaches for the allocation 
of parenthood and parental rights provide less stability and predictability for 
parents and children due to their confined nature.  Functional and 
psychological parenthood can only be established post-birth and after a 
significant period of time.116  Moreover, under these approaches the 
                                                          
 112. See Appleton, supra note 27, at 65-67; Dowd 2007, supra note 60, at 235-36; 
Murray, supra note 48, at 453. 
 113. See Appleton, supra note 27, at 58-59; Dowd 2007, supra note 60, at 246-47. 
 114. See, e.g., Response: And Baby Makes, supra note 27, at 2048. 
 115. See Id. at 2048-49. 
 116. In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), app. 
dismissed, 86 N.Y.2d 779 (1995); Storrow, supra note 22, at 640; Applying Intent-Based 
Parentage, supra note 26, at 437-38. 
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relationship with a legally unrecognized parent can be severed by the legally 
recognized parent, thus undermining his or her legal standing in the eyes of 
the courts and compromising the child’s best interests.117  This is especially 
true for multiparental families, in which not all intended parents necessarily 
share the same functions or have equal psychological attachment with the 
children.118  Without giving effect to the multiparents’ intentions, non-
recognized parents are at risk of losing their parental status both by state 
intervention and in cases where the relationship with the legally recognized 
parents becomes unsettled.119 
Conversely, the intention-based approach can capture the various 
categories of relationships that are characteristic of multiparental family 
structures.120  It can capture both pre- and post-birth intent,121 and it is not 
limited to a set number of parents, or to a strict hierarchal or egalitarian 
family structures.  Additionally, by overlooking the intent of the individuals 
who are acting as parents, a different family structure is imposed on them.  
This imposition infringes on the family’s autonomy, and in some regards 
their privacy, since the family becomes a matter of public debate, where not 
just the best interests of family members are considered but also societal 
interests.122  Hence, the family members’ dignity is infringed, as the family 
structure is condemned to be unrecognized by the law and therefore 
perceived as illegitimate by society.123  Consequently, multiparental families 
are not only devoid of rights, they are deprived of honor and respect.  
Therefore, the intention-based approach provides better protection to the 
                                                          
 117. Robert E. Rains, Three Parents? Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 2007 Pa 
Super Lexis 957 (Pa Super 2007), 20 DENNING L.J. 197, 207 (2008). 
 118. Kinsey, supra note 8, at 336-39. 
 119. See cases cited supra note 74. 
 120. Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive 
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 
110, 137 (2014). 
 121. Applying Intent-Based Parentage, supra note 26, at 437-39. 
 122. See Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical 
Family Law, 13(1) THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 361, 374-75 (2012). Contra Frances E. 
Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. & REF. 835, 835 
(1984) (criticizing privacy as a justification for non-intervention). 
 123. MAX RHEINSTEIN, The Family and the Law, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY LAW 13 (2004); Glendon, supra note 20, at 9-10; Marjorie 
Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 299-301 (1990); Jonathan 
Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis 
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 388-89 (1991). 
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family members’ dignity and autonomy, and consequently the child’s best 
interests,124 notwithstanding the fact that it provides better legal certainty in 
the determination of allocation of parental status. 
Yet, some might criticize the intention-based approach as not being clearly 
structured, and thus it is open to different interpretations by the courts.  
Subsequently, it could be argued that the intention-based approach will fail 
to provide sufficient predictability and security for multiparental families.125  
In this respect the genetic/biological approaches and the marital presumption 
approach are both clearer and more decisive.  Still, due to the many possible 
variations of multiparental families, an open and flexible norm is more 
adequate than a strict, bright-line rule.  Moreover, the ability to identify 
intentions – be that by means of a written contract, implied contract, or other 
methods of deduction – makes an intention-based approach not as vague as 
can be imagined on first sight. 
Another argument that has been made against the application of the 
intention-based approach is that the courts should refuse to enforce parenting 
contracts due to public policy considerations.126  The argument is that 
parental status should not be viewed as a commodity that can be negotiated 
and conferred via agreements,127 and that non-recognition of such 
agreements can prevent cases in which fathers are trying to relinquish their 
parental responsibilities.128  Considering that in most families there is a 
                                                          
 124. Bamforth, supra note 74, at 55-58; Goodman, supra note 59, at 36; Hill, supra 
note 123, at 364, 403-04; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s 
Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 465 (2016); Nancy Polikoff, From Third Parties to 
Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
195, 220 (2014). 
 125. Appleton, supra note 27, at 54; Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the 
Best Interest of the Child, 54(1) U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-21 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, 
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB., 226, 260 (1975); Storrow, supra note 22, at 639-40. 
 126. See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in 
Shaping Family Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1050 (2015). 
 127. Similar arguments were made in the context of adoption and surrogacy. See 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Why Commercial Surrogate Motherhood Unethically 
Commodifies Women and Children: Reply to McLachlan and Swales, 8 HEALTH CARE 
ANALYSIS, 19 (2000); China, and Children as a Commodity, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/31/opinion/la-ed-china31-2010jan31; Geoffrey 
York, Profit-Driven Adoptions Turn Children into a Commodity, GLOBE & MAIL (May 
29, 2012), www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/profit-driven-adoptions-turn-
children-into-a-commodity/article4217172/. 
 128. Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 
Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121, 122-23 (Pa. 2002); Bionormativity, supra note 
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power imbalance between the family members,129 parental agreements could 
lead to less than satisfactory results. 
Nonetheless, in cases where the intention of the multiparents was at the 
heart of the dispute, the courts have encouraged the use of parental 
agreements as a means to ensure that both the parties and the courts have a 
better understanding of the relationship at hand.130  Furthermore, in ART 
several courts and legislatures have given effect to such agreements,131 and 
in fact many forms of ART will be rendered impossible if public policy was 
indeed to rule out the possibility of using parental agreements.  For instance, 
sperm donors will necessarily be considered as the fathers, and surrogates as 
the mothers.  Accordingly, the more concerning matter of public policy is 
the prevention of an unbridgeable gap between those legally recognized as 
parents and those who are actually fulfilling this role.  In addition, contracts 
regarding parenthood and parental rights are not the only contracts that are 
enforceable in the context of family law.  Property division agreements are 
held valid and enforced in some jurisdictions.132  Indeed, contract law and 
                                                          
5, at 701-02. But see Joseph Cullen Ayer, Legitimacy and Marriage, 16(1) HARV. L. REV. 
22 (1902). 
 129. Murray, supra note 48, at 445. 
 130. Re D (contact and parental responsibility: lesbian mothers and known father) 
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 285 (Fam) (Eng.); A v. B and Another [2012] EWCA (Civ) 285 
(Eng.); Re WB (children) (contact) [2011] EWHC 3431 (Fam) (Eng.). 
 131. They recognized, for example, that a sperm donor only provides the genetic 
material, and has no other legal connection with the child. See, e.g., Family Law Act, 
S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 § 24 (Can.); Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5 § 7 (Can.); HFEA 
§ 35-41 (Eng.); Quebec Civil Code, S.Q. 1991 § 538.2 (Que.). Furthermore, in a number 
of common law countries, and in the Netherlands, allocation of parental responsibilities 
by agreement is allowed regardless of sex and number of other individuals who have 
those responsibilities. See, e.g., Family Law Act 1975 § 61D(s), 64C (Austl.); In re Mark: 
an application relating to parental responsibilities, [2003] FamCA 822 [Austl.]; Children 
Act 1989, c. 41, § 2, 4A (Eng.); Civil Partnership Act 2004 , c. 33, § 75(2) (Eng.); Care 
of Children Act (2004) § 23 (N.Z.). However, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden, for example, do not give effect to such agreements. NORDFORSK, LEGISLATION 
ON BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES – AN OVERVIEW 7-8 (2014). 
 132. See, e.g., Family Law Act 1975 § 90A-C (Austl); Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c F.3, § 52 (Can.); Property Relations Act 5773-1973 (Isr.); Hall v. Hall, 222 Cal. App. 
3d 578, 578 (Cal. 1990). However, not all jurisdictions enforce these agreements. For 
example, in England they cannot be enforced unless a court makes an order that reflect 
the terms of the agreement; and this will not be done if the agreement is unfair.  
Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534 (Eng.). Nonetheless, the 
Law Commission has recommended that legislation be introduced to make pre-nuptial 
and post-nuptial agreements enforceable. THE LAW COMMISSION, MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY, NEEDS AND AGREEMENTS 27 (2014). 
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notions derived therefrom are used in family law, and such use should not be 
disqualified a priori in the context of parental recognition. 
It should be noted that parental agreements do not apply contract law 
notions as if they are pure commercial transactions.  There are considerations 
that are unique to the family law context that influence contractual 
obligations, namely the child’s best interests.133  It is this principle that 
determines how notions such as enforcement, mistake, deception and 
withdrawal should apply – if at all.  For example, prior to conception it seems 
unreasonable to enforce a parenting agreement, forcing an individual to 
provide genetic material or carry a child.134  However, post-birth it might be 
reasonable to enforce a parenting agreement.  This could result in paying 
child support, visitation rights, or even recognition of parenthood and full 
parental responsibilities, depending on the particular circumstances.  
Similarly, post-birth an individual cannot unilaterally withdraw from the 
parenting agreement, thus causing the loss of her or any other individual’s 
parental status.  The intentions of the parents culminate in the conception of 
the child, and in this sense the conception makes the agreement binding not 
just between the intended parents but also, and more importantly, between 
them and the child. 
Considering all of the above-mentioned arguments, the intention-based 
approach is preferable.  It promotes dignity and autonomy by preventing the 
imposition of an ideal family structure on an existing family unit.  Moreover, 
it provides greater security and predictability to the family members, as they 
can trust that their intentions will be respected and awarded legal meaning.  
Lastly, such an approach is better equipped to deal with the realities of 
contemporary society, in which there is no singular family structure.  The 
adoption of an intention-based approach is, in a sense, an “organic” 
development, stemming from the shift from genetics, biology, and marriage 
as the main indicators for parenthood and parental responsibilities.135  There 
may very well still be the possibility that more than two individuals will 
claim exclusive parental rights,136 and the court could decide whether such 
rights should be awarded exclusively to one, two, three or more individuals.  
However, this does not mean that in each and every family there will be more 
than two parents. 
                                                          
 133. Zalesne, supra note 126, at 1081. 
 134. See, e.g., HCJ 4077/12 Plonit v. Minister of Health (Versa, 2013) (Isr.) (noting 
the specific decisions of Justice Robinstein in paragraphs 48-52 and Justice Amit in 
paragraphs 14-26). 
 135. Kinsey, supra note 8, at 306-07. 
 136. Id. at 333-34. 
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Note, the allocation of parental status should be addressed differently 
depending on two factors: First, is there agreement or disagreement among 
the multiparents in regard to each-other’s parental status; and second, the 
timing in which the allocation of parental status is requested – pre-birth, post-
birth, or post a stage of maturity, in which the child is mature enough to 
express her opinion.  The figure below clarifies how these two factors 
influence the allocation of parental status. 
 
 
 
It is reasonable that as long as there is agreement between the family 
members about the parental statuses, the state’s intervention should be 
minimal.  Pre-conception, the intent of the multiparents should determine 
each parent’s status, rights, and obligations.  In this scenario, individuals can 
both opt in or out of parental status.  Take, for example, a situation in which 
there is a sperm donor and a lesbian couple.  Pre-conception, the couple and 
donor could agree on any form of division of status, rights, and obligations.  
The family model could be egalitarian, hierarchal, and there might even be 
situation in which both the sperm donor and the non-genetic mother have no 
parental standing.  Similarly, post-conception but pre-maturity, it is possible 
for an additional individual to opt-in to multiparenthood.  Again, the state 
should not regulate multiparental families, but merely recognize them. This 
is the case as maintaining minimal intervention will promote the 
multiparental family members’ equality, preserve their autonomy, and 
ensure the child’s best interests.  When the child reaches maturity and 
additional individuals wish to opt-in to multiparenthood, her intentions must 
also be considered. However, if some of the multiparents wish to opt-out of 
their status at any point past conception, the state must regulate this scenario, 
even if there is agreement among the family members. Unlike opting in to 
multiparenthood, opting-out could risk the child’s best interests. Therefore, 
it cannot simply be a matter left at the hands of the family members. This 
notion is not unfamiliar. When individuals wish to give a child up for 
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adoption, change custody arrangements or child support, the state regulates 
the process to ensure the child’s best interests are protected.  These are 
instances of single or dual parents opting-out, and states are already 
experienced in dealing with these situations.  Therefore, there is nothing 
novel in applying the same logic and treatment to the multiparental family. 
The story is quite different if there is disagreement about the parental 
statuses.  Under these circumstances, the child’s best interests might be at 
risk, thus state intervention and regulation may become necessary and 
justified.137  That said, such intervention and regulation is not unique to 
multiparental families.  Indeed, whenever there is disagreement about 
parental status courts intervene to protect the child’s best interests – whether 
it is a “traditional” family structures or not.138 
That said, it would be wise to apply a somewhat different treatment to 
disputes that occur pre-birth, post-birth, and post-maturity.  Pre-birth, the 
main consideration should be the multiparents’ pre-conception intent, and 
the child’s bests interests should be a secondary factor.  The reason is 
twofold.  First, pre-conception intent is preferable to pre-birth intent.  By 
choosing the former over the latter it becomes possible to identify who 
intended – explicitly or implicitly – to bring the child into the world.  Hence, 
it is justified to bind these individuals according to their initial intent, as it 
will ensure the child’s best interests as well as equality between the 
multiparents.  The justification is not as strong when it comes to pre-birth 
intent, as in such a case the individuals who were not a part of the conception 
process are not on equal footing with those who were.139 
                                                          
 137. Cf. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. 2004). 
 138. Scherpe, supra note 18, at 211 (noting that state regulation is intended to protect 
the weaker family members, primarily the child, but also other parents. However, by 
doing so it infringes the family members’ autonomy. It has been suggested that in such 
instances it will be justified infringing the right to autonomy if the need to protect the 
weaker party is significantly stronger). 
 139. Consider the following examples. In an open adoption multiparental family 
structure there are the genetic and biological mother, and two adoptive parents. In most 
cases, the genetic and biological mother has pre-conception intent, while the adoptive 
parents do not. If before the child is born the mother changes her mind, and decides not 
to give the child up for adoption, it hardly seems justified to compel her to do so. The 
adoptive parents, in such a scenario, have less of a standing against the genetic and 
biological mother, as they do not have pre-conception intent. In contrast, imagine a 
multiparental family structure that is established through ART. This family includes a 
genetic father, his spouse, and a biological mother, while the egg donor is not intended 
to be the genetic mother. Under this description, all three have pre-conception intent even 
though the spouse has no genetic or biological link to the child, and it therefore justified 
to impose on all three the parental status they intended to hold. 
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Second, the multiparents’ pre-conception intent should be adhered to only 
to the extent that such adherence will not be detrimental to the child, in which 
case the child’s best interests should guide the courts in the allocation of 
parental status.  Note, from the perspective of the child and her best interests, 
the family unit has not crystallized yet; the child has not become dependent 
upon or attached to any individuals.  In these cases it is important to protect 
the weaker party without forcing a foreign ideology on the family unit by 
fitting it in a family structure that resembles a “traditional” structure.140  This 
could be done even if the resulting family unit is composed of a single parent, 
same-sex parents, or multiparents. 
Conversely, post-birth but pre-maturity, the child’s best interests vary 
substantially, since she might have grown attached to (or dependent on) all 
the individuals who fulfilled parental roles during her upbringing.  Hence, 
there is greater justification to focus equally on the multiparents’ pre-
conception intent as well as the child’s best interests. 
Last, in post-maturity the weight of the multiparents’ pre-conception 
intent should be small, and the emphasis should be placed on the child’s best 
interests.  When disagreement about parental status arises in this stage of a 
child’s life, after many years of parental care, the initial pre-conception 
intentions seem almost irrelevant.  Rather, it is the actual parenting that took 
place, as well as the emotional bonds between the family members, should 
guide the courts in determining the parental status.  At this stage, the courts 
need to consider not only the multiparents conception of the family structure, 
but the child’s understanding of it too. 
Following the suggestions outlined above will allow courts and 
legislatures to capture, and cater for, the five categories of multiparental 
families: ART, co-parenting, stepfamilies, open adoptions, and kinship 
carers.  This is true regardless to these families’ intent on being egalitarian 
or hierarchal.  As such, these suggestions provide extensive protection to 
both the integrity of the family unit and the child’s best interests. 
                                                          
 140. Coupet, supra note 8, at 649 (explaining such a balance of contrasting rights 
already exists in ART where, for instance, a sperm donor or a surrogate mother are not 
considered parents although they have a genetic or biological connection to the child); 
e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:12 (2015); Family Law Act B.C. § 24; Family Law 
Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5 § 7 (Can.); Québec Civil Code, S.Q. 1991, c. CCQ, § 538.2 
(Can.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 3 (Can.); Children’s Act 
2005, c. 19 § 297(1) (S. Afr.); Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 5756-1996 §§ 10-12 (Isr.); 
Family Code of Ukraine 2002 § 123(3) (Ukr.); see HFEA §§ 35-41 (Eng.). Compare 
HFEA § 33 (Eng.), with NORDFORSK, supra note 130, at 8. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzed the legal attitudes regarding recognition and 
regulation of multiparents, and suggested a new approach to this issue.  It 
was illustrated that some courts and legislatures have begun allocating 
parental statuses to multiparents.  Yet, conferring parental status to 
multiparents could be described as a spectrum – from merely recognizing the 
social label of parents, through the allocation of parental responsibilities, to 
a recognition of parenthood status.  Arguments opposing conferring legal 
status to multiparents were confronted and dismissed.  A new approach to 
the recognition of multiparents was suggested, which is guided by the 
multiparents’ intent and the child’s best interests.  Particularly, it was 
suggested that recognition of multiparents should not be confined to any 
particular family structure, but rather it should provide for a spectrum of 
recognition and regulation in order to accommodate the various forms of 
multiparental families and thus guarantee the child’s best interests. 
The nexus between changing social norms and legal advances is strong.  
Changing social norms necessitate legal advances;141 and legal advances 
have an impact on social norms and institutions142 such as the family, even 
if this impact is somewhat limited.  The recognition of multiparental family 
structures is a good example of this nexus.  The growing number of 
multiparental families has led to the unavoidable need for their recognition, 
and at the same time such legal recognition may encourage multiparental 
families to form. 
This paper demonstrates that the allocation of legal parental status to 
multiparents is an expanding phenomenon, emerging in different countries 
and continents, promoting social and normative change while protecting the 
most fundamental and influential aspect of every person – family life.  Only 
time will tell if, when, and how other jurisdictions will join this trend.143  It 
                                                          
 141. See Glendon, supra note 21, at 4; Haim Abraham, Parenting, Surrogacy, and the 
State, 9 HEBREW U. J. OF LEGIS. 171, 200 (2017). 
 142. Eden Sarid, Don’t Be A Drag, Just Be A Queen—How Drag Queens Protect their 
Intellectual Property without Law, 10 FIU L. Rev., 133, 179 (2014). 
 143. Recently, Ontario passed a bill that allows for the recognition of up to four 
multiparents from birth without a court order, if they have signed a pre-conception 
parentage agreement. All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related Registrations 
Statute Law Amendment), S.O. 2016 c. 23 § 9-10 (Can.). Furthermore, if the child was 
conceived through surrogacy a court can declare she has more than four multiparents. Id. 
§ 11. Soon, Australia might also recognize multiparents, as the Family Law Council 
advised the federal government to recognize more than two legal parents. See generally 
FAMILY LAW COUNCIL, REPORT ON PARENTAGE AND THE FAMILY LAW ACT (2013). The 
Netherlands might also be joining this trend. A recent report submitted to the 
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is already clear that multiparental families have the potential to change how 
we think about what it means to be a family. 
 
                                                          
Netherlands’ Minister of Justice advocates conferring parental status to up to four legal 
parents, who together form a maximum of two separate households. CHILDREN SHOULD 
BE ABLE TO HAVE UP TO FOUR LEGAL PARENTS: REPORT DUTCHNEWS.NL (2016), 
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/12/dutch-family-law-needs-overhauling-to-
reflect-multi-parent-families-report (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). 
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